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Watson: Pebble Beach v. Tour 18: No Mulligans Allowed

CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

PEBBLE BEACH v. TOUR 18: NO MULLIGANS
ALLOWED

I. INTRODUCTION
Service marks and trade dress are protected under the Lanham Act.!
Having a protectable service mark or trade dress gives the owner a
great deal of exclusive power over their particular mark or trade
dress. Pebble Beach v. Tour 18 is the most recent in a long line of
cases where a court has to determine if an entity's use of registered
service mark or trade dress is likely to cause consumer confusion. In
this case, the court gave a very broad meaning to the doctrine of the
likelihood of confusion. The court applied the likelihood of
confusion test to include a likelihood of confusion as to permission,
even with the presence of disclaimers. The court also examined trade
dress in the context of golf course designs. Here the court decided
that if a particular hole design was distinctive in its own right, as
apart from the golf course design as a whole, it could receive
protection.
2
II. PEBBLE BEACH COMPANY V. TOUR 18 1, LTD.

A. Facts
In the late 1980's, three men from Texas decided to build a public
golf course in the Houston area.' Knowing that well-designed holes
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1992).
2. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd. 942 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
3. Id at 1531-1532.
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were the key to success, they decided to replicate golf holes from
some of the most famous and challenging golf courses around the
country. The name "Tour 18" was chosen for the course in order to
stay consistent with the owners' theme.' In selecting which holes to
replicate, criteria such as the fame of the course, the fame of the hole
itself, and the ability to replicate the hole considering the land
conditions of the proposed site were considered.6 Among the
eighteen holes chosen to be part of Tour 18 were Hole Fourteen at
Pebble Beach Golf Links, Hole Three at Pinehurst No. 2, and Hole
Eighteen at Harbour Town Golf Links. 7 The respective owners of
these three golf courses are the plaintiffs in this case.
The owners of Tour 18 copied the plaintiffs' golf hole designs so
that the layout of the original hole and its replication in Humble,
Texas, were nearly identical! However, the owners of Tour 18 did
not limit themselves to the use of the famous hole designs. They also
used the service marks of golf courses from which they copied hole
designs.9 The service marks, "Pebble Beach", "Pinehurst", and
"Harbour Town" were used in conjunction with the name Tour 18.10
Tour 18 used the plaintiffs' service marks on each of the holes to
inform golfers which replication they were playing.1 In addition to
signs at each of the holes, Tour 18 used the plaintiffs' service marks
in their advertisements. 2 Tour 18 advertised in golf magazines
throughout Texas and around the nation.'3 In these advertisements,
the plaintiffs' service marks were displayed along with the Tour 18
name. 4 Tour 18 also used the plaintiffs' service marks on the
scorecards and yardage guides given to players when they paid for a
round of golf. 5 Finally, Tour 18 used the plaintiffs' service marks on
4. Id. at 1532.

5. id
6. Id at 1532.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1533.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id at 1534.
12. Id. at 1533.

13. Id.
14. Id at 1533.
15. Id. at 1534.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/4
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the menu of the "Inn on the Tour" restaurant.16 Golfers who ate at Inn
on the Tour could order such things as "Pebble Beach" French Toast,
"The Harbour Town" hamburger, or "The Pinehurst" tuna salad. 7
Tour 18 used the plaintiffs' service marks almost as often as they
used their own name.
The extent to which the court ruled that Tour 18 violated the rights
of the plaintiffs differed for each plaintiff. It is therefore necessary to
distinguish between the three plaintiffs. First, there is Pebble Beach
Golf Links ("Pebble Beach"), located in Del Monte Forest,
California. Pebble Beach is considered one ofthe most beautiful and
challenging golf courses in the world." Because of the course's fame
and exclusive reputation, Tour 18 copied hole fourteen from the
Pebble Beach Golf Links course. 9 It is important to note that Pebble
Beach does not feature hole fourteen in any of its advertising
materials. 0 Pebble Beach does not own a trademark, copyright, or
patent for the design of hole fourteen.2 However, Pebble Beach does
own an incontestable service mark for golfing services under the
name "Pebble Beach". 22
The second plaintiff is Resorts. Resorts owns and operates seven
golf courses in Pinehurst, North Carolina under the name Pinehurst.'
Like Pebble Beach, Pinehurst No. 2 is regarded as one of the most
challenging golf courses in the country.24 Tour 18 included a replica
of hole three from Pinehurst No. 2.25 Although Pinehurst promotes
its course extensively, it does not include any photographs of hole
three in its advertisements.26 While Pinehurst does not hold a
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1534.
Id.
Id. at 1527.
Id. at 1528.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id at 1528; 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1996) allows for a registered service mark to
be deemed incontestable after it has been used in commerce for five consecutive
years. Once a mark is deemed incontestable it is subject only to seven defenses
outlined in § 1115(b).
23. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1528.

24. Id at 1529.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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trademark, copyright, or patent for the design of hole three,27 it does
own a registered service mark for the name "Pinehurst. '2 The
service mark, however, is not incontestable.29
The final plaintiff is the Sea Pines Company ("Sea Pines"). Sea
Pines owns Harbour Town Golf Links ("Harbour Town"). Like the
other two golf courses, Harbour Town is famous in the golfing world.
Tour 18 copied hole eighteen from Harbour Town.3" Unlike the other
two plaintiffs, hole eighteen is featured in all of the advertising
materials for Harbour Town.31 Harbour Town's hole eighteen is well
known mainly because of a lighthouse that provides the hole's
backdrop.32 The lighthouse is often shown on television during
professional golf tournaments, and evidence at trial indicated that
much of the course's fame stems from golfers who associate the
course with the lighthouse.33 Tour 18 capitalized on this by
constructing a lighthouse on its version of Harbour Town hole
eighteen.34 The Tour 18 version of the lighthouse was very realistic
and nearly identical to Harbour Town's lighthouse.3 Neither the
design of hole eighteen nor the design of the lighthouse are protected
by trademark, copyright, or patent law. 6 Additionally, Sea Pines
does not own a federal registration for the service mark "Harbour
'
Town."37
Sea Pines did, however, obtain federal trademark and
service mark registrations for the lighthouse logo.38

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id at 1529-1530.
Id.at 1529.
Id.
Id at 1530.
Id.at 1531.
Id.
Id at 1530.
Id.
Id at 1544.
Id.at 1531.
Id.
Id. These registrations allowed Sea Pines exclusive use of the lighthouse

logo for such things as golf balls, golf equipment, novelty items, real estate services,
and resort hotel services.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/4
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B. ProceduralHistory
The case was brought and tried before the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, on October 31, 1995. 39 Final post-trial
submissions were filed by January 11, 1996.40 An amended order and
final judgement were delivered on November 6, 1996.41
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs alleged that Tour 18's replication of their golf hole
designs and use of their service marks violate various state and
federal laws. 42 The plaintiffs' federal claims included service mark
infringement, trade dress infringement, unfair competition, and false
advertising under the Lanham Act.43 Under Texas coifimon law, the
plaintiffs brought claims for unfair competition, conversion, civil
conspiracy, service mark infringement, and trade dress dilution.'
A. Service MarkInfringement and Unfair Competition
All three plaintiffs brought service mark infringement and unfair
competition claims in violation of the Lanham Act (the "Act"). The
plaintiffs claim that Tour 18's use of the terms "Pebble Beach,"
"Pinehurst," and "Harbour Town," as well as its use of the lighthouse
violated their rights under sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Act.45
Claims based on infringement of federally registered service marks
are covered under section 32(1) of the Act.46 Claims based on
39. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1526.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 1513.
Id. at 1526.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1992).
Pebble Beach, 942 F.Supp. At 1526.
Id. at 1536.15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (1992).
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who shall, without consent of the registrant- (a) use
in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
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infringement of unregistered marks and unfair competition are
covered under section 43(a) of the Act.47
In order to succeed under a section 32(1) or 43(a) claim, the
registrant must first establish that its mark is valid and worthy of
protection, and second, that the defendant's use of the mark is likely
to cause consumer confusion.48
The first determination courts must make in analyzing any
infringement problem is whether the plaintiffs mark is strong enough
to warrant protection.49 In making this determination, the court puts
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b)
reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles
or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1996).
47. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which- (a) is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person... shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (1996).
48. See Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff must
establish, first, that its mark is valid, and second, that the defendant's use of the
mark is likely to cause confusion. A defendant is then liable for infringement if he
uses (1) any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of the mark; (2)
without the registrant's consent; (3) in commerce; (4) in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods; (5) where such use is
likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive).
49. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1536.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/4
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the mark into one of four categories. ° A mark will either be deemed
generic, descriptive, suggestive, or fanciful or arbitrary." Generic2
marks can never receive trademark or service mark protection.1
Marks which are descriptive do not receive protection initially, but
can obtain protection upon a showing of secondary meaning.53
Suggestive, fanciful, or arbitrary marks are immediately protectable
and do not need a showing of secondary meaning.54
Pebble Beach owned an incontestable service mark. When marks
are used in commerce for five consecutive years, they are considered
incontestable and subject only to certain defenses. 6 Tour 18 asserted
that Pebble Beach's mark was descriptive and, therefore, required a
showing of secondary meaning.57 Because the mark is incontestable,
it cannot be challenged as lacking secondary meaning."
Incontestable marks amount to conclusive evidence of the owner's
exclusive right to use the mark for the products or services
specified. 9 Based on a showing that its mark was incontestable, the
court ruled that Pebble Beach successfully proved that its mark was
valid and worthy of protection.60
Because the service mark for Pinehurst was not incontestable,
50. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.

1976) (the classes of marks in ascending order of protection are: (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) fanciful or arbitrary; marks which are generic
can never get trademark protection, descriptive marks do not initially receive
protection but can acquire it upon a showing of secondary meaning, and suggestive,
fanciful, and arbitrary marks are protectable even absent a showing of secondary
meaning).
51. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 9.
52. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1528.

56. Id.(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1996)).
57. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537.
58. Id.See also, Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.
1980) (an incontestable mark cannot be challenged as lacking secondary meaning;
such marks are conclusively presumed to be nondescriptive or to have acquired
secondary meaning).
59. PebbleBeach, 942 F.Supp. at 1537 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1115(a)

(1996)).
60. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Resorts faced a higher burden than that of Pebble Beach.6 The fact
that Pinehurst registered its service mark is important because
registration of a mark invokes a statutory presumption that the mark
is both valid and protectable.62 However, because the service mark
was not incontestable, Resorts was required to show that the mark
was either arbitrary or that it was descriptive but had acquired
secondary meaning.63 Tour 18 argued that "Pinehurst" was
geographically descriptive and required a showing of secondary
meaning.' 4 The court rejected this argument and held that the mark
was arbitrary.65 Pinehurst was considered to be a valid service mark
worthy of protection.66
Sea Pines, the owner of the Harbour Town service mark, faced an
even greater burden than Pebble Beach and Resorts because Harbour
Town was not a registered service mark.6 7 The mark "Harbour
Town" could still be protected under §43(a) of the Lanham Act if Sea
Pines could show that its mark was either inherently distinctive or had
acquired secondary meaning.6" Tour 18 argued that the mark
"Harbour Town" was geographically descriptive.69 As with the
61. Id. at 1537-38.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1996) provides in pertinent part: "Any registration
issued under the Act, or of a mark registered on the principal register and owned by
a party to an action shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie
evidence of the validity of the registered and of the registration of the mark..."
63. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537.
64. Id. at 1538. A mark is geographically descriptive if it describes to
consumers the geographic origin of the goods or services rather than the source of
the goods or services. Burke- Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes,
Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
65. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1539. The court went on to rule that even if
Pinehurst was descriptive, their extensive advertising and fame among golfers
equaled the requisite showing of secondary meaning. In making this finding of
secondary meaning, the court looked at such factors as the length and manner of the
use of the mark, the extent of advertising and promotion of the mark, and the
defendant's intent in copying the mark. The court considered the fact that Tour 18
intentionally copied the Pinehurst mark in attempt to capitalize on the established
goodwill associated with the name "Pinehursf injustifying its finding of secondary
meaning.
66. Id
67. Id.

68. See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
69. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1539.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/4
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Pinehurst mark, the court rejected this argument and held that
Harbour Town was an arbitrary mark.70 The court looked, in part, to
the intent of Harbour Town owners in developing their service
mark.71 Although not required by the court, Harbour Town also made
a showing that its mark had acquired secondary meaning.' The'court
looked to the same factors it applied to the Pinehurst mark to justify
a finding of secondary meaning.73 The mark "Harbour Town" was
arbitrary, and it had acquired secondary meaning. Based on these two
facts, the court ruled that the mark was valid and worthy of
protection.74
The owners of the Harbour Town mark also sought protection for
the lighthouse that is displayed on hole eighteen because the
lighthouse logo ig used in Harbour Town's advertisements for golfing
services.' Tour 18 argued that Sea Pines abandoned the mark when
76
it began to use a Compass Rose as its corporate logo in the 1980'S.
Abandonment, as defined in Section 1127 of the Act, is generally
asserted by a defendant as an affirmative defense.77 The court found
that although Sea Pines did adopt the Compass Rose as its corporate
logo, the company still continued to use the lighthouse logo on other
services.78 The court rejected Tour 18's abandonment
products and
79
argument.
By proving that the lighthouse had acquired a strong secondary
meaning, Sea Pines successfully demonstrated that the lighthouse
70. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1539.
71. Id at 1539; the court reasoned that the mark was arbitrary and chosen by the
owners to designate their goods and services. The court went on to argue that the
mark has always been associated with Harbour Town and its golf course services.
72. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1540.
73. See supranote 65 at 1539. The court specifically looked to the extensive
promotion of the name "Harbour Town" in addition to the number of professional
golf tournaments held at the Harbour Town golf course. The court also considered
the frequency and manner in which the Harbour Town name and logo were
displayed in advertising brochures along with the fact that the defendant

intentionally copied the mark.
74. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp at 1540.
75. Id
76. Id
77. See, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1992).
78. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1540.
79. Id at 1540-41.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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logo was a valid and enforceable service mark. The strong secondary
meaning was evidenced by the fact that in armost all Harbour Town
advertisements, the lighthouse logo was depicted.8" In addition,
televised professional golf tournaments always showed the lighthouse
when showing hole eighteen."' Furthermore, Sea Pines's Harbour
Town hole eighteen became known by the nickname, the "lighthouse
hole," and golfers associate the presence of the lighthouse as a part of
Harbour Town. 2 These factors convinced the court that the
lighthouse logo was entitled to service mark protection under section
83
43(a) of the Lanham Act.
With respect to the first element of the test establishing service
mark infringement, the court concluded that the names Pebble Beach,
Pinehurst and Harbour Town, as well as Harbour Town's lighthouse
logo were all valid and enforceable service marks.' Having satisfied
the first element of the test for infringement, the plaintiffs were then
required to show that there was a likelihood of confusion. 5
Proving likelihood of confusion requires a showing that the
defendant's use of a service mark is likely to cause confusion among
the relevant class of customers as well as potential customers.86
Courts have read the likelihood of confusion to encompass a very
broad meaning of the term "confusion." Not only do courts include
confusion as to pr6ducts, but also as to sponsorship, affiliation
between plaintiff and defendant, and whether the plaintiff has granted
the defendant permission to use a particular service mark.
Tour 18 argued that no likelihood of confusion existed because
golfers playing golf in Houston would obviously know that they were
not playing at Pebble Beach, Pinehurst, or Harbour Town. 8 The
80. Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id
Id at 1532.
15 U.S.C. §1127 (1992).
PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537, 1539, 1541.
85. Id.at 1541.
86. Id
87. See, Fuji Photo Film v. Shinorhara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
596 (5th Cir. 1985); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did If Enterprises, 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th
Cir. 1993); Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Levi Strauss, 841 F.Supp. 506, 514-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
88. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1541.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/4
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court, however, found that Tour 18's interpretation of "likelihood of
confusion" was too narrow. 9 The court pointed out that even though
golfers would know that they were in Houston, there would still be
confusion as to whether the plaintiffs sponsored or gave permission
to Tour 18 to use their hole designs and service marks.' In analyzing
the facts of this case, the court focused on whether Tour 18's use of
the plaintiffs' service marks would cause confusion as to affiliation
or sponsorship between Tour 18 and the plaintiffs. 91
In addressing the question of whether a likelihood of confusion
exists, courts look to a number of different factors. These factors
include: 1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark; 2) the degree of
similarity between the marks; 3) the similarity between products or
services involved; 4) the sophistication of the consumer; 5) the
similarity in advertising; 6) the defendant's intent; and 7) the degree
of actual confusion.92 Because this is a balancing test, the plaintiffs
need not show that all or even a majority of the factors weigh in their
93
favor.
The court in Pebble Beach first considered the strength and
distinctiveness of the plaintiffs' marks.94 This same inquiry is used
when assessing whether a mark is valid and worthy of protection. In
applying this inquiry, the court places the mark into one of four
categories and, if necessary, determines whether the mark has
achieved secondary meaning.95 In determining the strength of the
plaintiffs mark, the court takes the analysis one step further and
looks to the effectiveness of the mark as a source indicator, as well as
the degree of third party use of the same or similar marks.9 6
The court previously categorized the plaintiffs' marks and
determined that they were valid and strong.9 7 Tour 18 argued that
89. Id
90. Id. at 1541-42.
91. Id. at 1542 (citing Taco Cabana Int'l v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113,
1122 (5th Cir. 1991)).
92. Id.
93. See, Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (5th

Cir. 1982).
94. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1542.
95. See supra note 50.
96. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1542.
.97. dat 1537, 1539, 1541.
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third party use of all the marks, including the Harbour Town
lighthouse, weakened the strength of all the marks.98 The court
rejected this argument and said that the third party uses in this case
were limited and not sufficiently widespread to weaken the strength
of the marks.99 All the marks were either arbitrary or had acquired
strong secondary meaning. The evidence was insufficient to show
that they had been weakened."' The court was also swayed by the
fact that the defendant used the plaintiffs' marks extensively in an
attempt to capitalize on the goodwill the marks had achieved.'0 ' Tour
18 relied on the strength of the plaintiffs' marks to sell its services.'0 2
Therefore, the strength of the mark weighed in the plaintiffs' favor.0 3
The second factor analyzes the similarity between the plaintiffs'
service marks and the defendant's use of the marks.0 4 This factor
takes into account not just the visual similarity, but how consumers
are likely to perceive the marks in the marketplace." 5 Tour 18 used
the plaintiffs' marks extensively in advertising and promotion."° The
marks were also used on scorecards, course signs, yardage guides,
and restaurant menus.'0 7 When the marks were used, they were
displayed prominently.0 8 The plaintiffs' actual marks and the
defendants use of the marks were identical except for the fact that
98. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1543. Tour 18 tried to argue that there were

sufficient third party uses of "Pinehurst" to warrant a finding that the mark had been
weakened. Tour 18 pointed to the use of the name in "Pinehurst National" and
"Pinehurst Plantation." Tour 18 also pointed to evidence where other golf courses
had used a lighthouse and a lighthouse logo. In both cases the court said that this
was not sufficient to warrant a finding that the mark was weakened. Both Pinehurst
and the Harbour Town lighthouse were strong source indicators.
99. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1543.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 1544.
102. Id
103. Id.at 1543-44.
104. Id.at 1544.
105. See, Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.

1984) (the marks must be considered in light of the way the marks are encountered
in the marketplace and the circumstances surrounding the purchase of plaintiff and
defendant's services).
106. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1544.
107. Id.
108. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/4
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Tour 18's replicated lighthouse was smaller than Harbour Town's
original." 9 However, Tour 18's lighthouse was painted the same
color and positioned on the same spot in relation to the golf hole as
Harbour Town's. 110
Tour 18 tried to defeat the claim that their use was similar to the
actual marks by arguing that whenever they used the plaintiffs' marks
or depicted the plaintiffs' hole designs, the Tour 18 logo was always
Although this does
used in conjunction with the other marks.'
alleviate a likelihood of confusion as to a hole's source, it does not
alleviate possible confusion as to sponsorship or permission.112 The
Pebble Beach court went even further and concluded that Tour 18's
use of their logo in conjunction with the plaintiffs' marks actually
added to the likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or
permission.'1 3 In effect Tour 18's argument hurt more than it helped.
The third factor the court considered was the degree of similarity
between the products and services of the plaintiffs and the
defendant." 4 It is a generally established rule that the more similar
the products or services are, the greater the likelihood of confusion. 15
Tour 18 argued that its services were significantly different from the
plaintiffs' services.1 6 Tour 18 is a public golf course that charges a
daily fee to play golf.1 7 In contrast, the plaintiffs' facilities are
18
exclusive, private resorts that cater to an elite group of customers.
The court agreed that there were differences between the plaintiffs'
facilities and the defendant's golf course, but the bottom line for the
court was that both the plaintiffs and the defendant provided golf
services. 1 9 Based on this fact, the court found that the similarity
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1545.
115. See, Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d
500, 505 (5th Cir. 1980).
116. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1545.
117. Id.
118. Id at 1545; fees for one round of golf at the plaintiffs' courses range from
$145 to $195, this is compared to the fee of $55 that Tour 18 charges per round.
119. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1545.
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between products or services favored the plaintiffs. 120
The court next considered the identity of the purchasers and service
facilities."2 The court focused on where the customers were likely to
come from and the fact that many of the golfers who play Tour 18 are
likely to have played on one of the plaintiffs' courses. 122 Tour 18
argued that their customers are mainly from the Houston area, while
the plaintiffs' customers are wealthy tourists from all over the
country."z According to Tour 18, this fact indicated that there was no
likelihood of confusion among actual or potential customers.124 The
court found that based on the trial testimony of golfers, many played
at Tour 18 and at the plaintiffs' courses. 125 This finding was
supported by Tour 18's concept of replication and its extensive
126
advertising.
The fifth factor examined by the court, with respect to the
127
likelihood of confusion, was the identity of the advertising media.
In its analysis of this factor, the court focused on the degree of
similarity between the advertising campaigns of the plaintiffs and the
defendant. 12' Generally, the greater the similarity between the
advertising campaigns, the greater the chance that there will be
customer confusion. 129 Tour 18 argued that their advertising
campaign was different because it focused mainly on the Houston
area while the plaintiffs advertised on a national level. 30 This
argument failed because Tour 18 advertised in some national golf
120. Id.at 1546.
121. Id
122. Id at 1545-46.
123. Id at 1546.
124. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1546.
125. Id. at 1546-48.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id
129. See, Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d
500, 506 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1546. Evidence showed that Tour 18
advertises in local trade magazines and newspapers including Golf Coast Golfer,
Metro Houston Golfer, Shell's Guide to Golf in Houston, and the Houston
Chronicle. The plaintiffs concentrate their advertising on national publications such
as Golf Digest.
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magazines. 3 ' The court recognized that Tour 18's advertising
concentration was regional, but concluded that the course owners
sought national exposure by advertising in national golf
publications. 32 The court said there could also be a high likelihood
of confusion on a regional level because the plaintiffs' national
advertising efforts reached Texas and, more specifically, the Houston
area.'33 Since the advertising campaigns overlapped, ads by all the
parties were likely to be read by customers of both the plaintiffs and
the defendant.'34 Under this reasoning, the court found in favor of the
plaintiffs with respect to the identity of the advertising media.
The court next examined Tour 18's intentions in using the
plaintiffs' marks. 35 There is strong evidence of a likelihood of
confusion where a defendant uses a mark in order to obtain a benefit
from the reputation and good will of the plaintiff.'36 A showing of
intentional copying on the part of the defendant allows for an
inference of confusion. 37 The facts in this case show that Tour 18
intentionally copied the plaintiffs' service marks in its advertisements
and golf course designs. 38 Tour 18 argued that their uses of the
plaintiffs' marks were to inform the public which replication they
were playing."3 In looking to Tour 18's intentions in copying the
marks, the court focused on the fact that Tour 18 used the plaintiffs'
marks frequently and prominently. 4 The court believed this went
beyond the point of merely informing the public. 41 Tour 18's intent
to capitalize on the good reputation of the plaintiffs was further
131. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1546. Tour 18 often places advertisements
in Golf Digest.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id; See also, Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 490 (5th
Cir. 1992) (where advertising campaigns overlap such that ads are likely to be read
by customers of both the plaintiff and the defendant, the factor was met).
135. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1546.
136. Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1259 (5th Cir.
1989).
137. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 985 (11th Cir. 1986).
138. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1546.
139. Id. at 1547.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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evidenced by the fact that Tour 18 referred to the popular nicknames
given to some of the holes, such as "the lighthouse hole." '42 These
nicknames contained the reputation and good will that the plaintiffs
worked hard to build.14 1 The court reasoned that use of nicknames is
unnecessary if the true intent is to inform the public.'" Therefore, the
145
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to this factor.
Courts also consider any evidence of actual confusion in
considering whether there is a likelihood of confusion.146 Although
proof of actual consumer confusion helps a plaintiff, actual confusion
147
is not necessary to justify a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Evidence of actual confusion is usually shown by either testimonial
evidence or survey evidence.1 41 The plaintiffs used both testimonial
and survey evidence to show that there was actual confusion as
whether permission had been given to Tour 18 to use the plaintiffs'
marks. 149 Tour 18's only recourse was to try to refute the survey
methods employed by the plaintiffs. 5 ° Tour 18 attacked the control
group used by the plaintiffs and argued that the survey only included
past customers and did not include potential customers.' The court
rejected this argument by stating that similar surveys have been
upheld in the past when past customers are likely to be repeat
customers. 152 The court noted that the plaintiffs' survey included a
question that asked if golfers were likely to play Tour 18 again."'
The court went on to rule that the plaintiffs' survey was proper given
that their claim was based on the notion that Tour 18's use of the
service marks was to deceive Tour 18 golfers into believing that the
142. Id.
143. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1547.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id
147. See, Lois Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.
1986).

148. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1547.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id
Id.
at 1548.
Id.
at 1549.
Id

153. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1549.
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plaintiffs gave their permission to Tour 18 to use their marks." 4
Given the fact that the survey methodology was found to be valid and
that there was evidence of actual confusion, the court found in favor
of the plaintiffs on the issue of actual confusion.155
Although not sufficient to convince the court, Tour 18's strongest
argument was its use of disclaimers.'56 In determining whether there
is a likelihood of confusion, courts can consider the effect of
disclaimers. 7 The use of disclaimers can minimize or even
eliminate the likelihood of confusion. 5 However, the use of
disclaimers does not mean that there will be no likelihood of
confusion.'59 To determine the effectiveness of disclaimers, the court
looked to such factors as the content, size and location of the
defendant's disclaimers."6 Tour 18 placed disclaimers on brochures,
advertisements and tee box signs. 6 ' Tour 18 argued that their
disclaimers effectively dispelled any consumer confusion. 62 The
court rejected this argument and concluded that Tour 18's disclaimers
were ineffective. 63 Tour 18 did not put disclaimers on all or even
most of their advertisements." 4 The ads that did include disclaimers
were inconspicuous.165 The disclaimers were written in small type
and placed in obscure locations.1 66 Additionally, Tour 18 did not
1 67
place disclaimers in their press releases or in their restaurant menu.
The court considered all these facts and concluded that Tour 18's
disclaimers failed to dispel the likelihood of confusion.

154. Id.
155. Id at 1550.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. See, August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618-619 (7th Cir.
1995).
159. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp at 1550.
160. Id.at 1551.
161. Id
162. Id
163. Id
164. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1551.
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id
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B. Trade Dress Infringement
The plaintiffs claimed that Tour 18's copying of their golf hole
designs, as well as the use of the Harbour Town lighthouse, were
trade dress infringements and unfair competition in violation of the
Lanham Act. 161 The trade dresses at issue included the shapes and
dimensions of the plaintiffs' holes, the placement of obstacles, the
slope and elevation of the holes, and in the case of Harbour Town, the
1 69
design and appearance of the lighthouse.
Courts use a two-step analysis to determine if there is trade dress
infringement. 70 First, courts determine whether a plaintiffs trade
dress qualifies for protection.' The courts look to the distinctiveness
of the trade dress, secondary meaning, and functionality when
considering whether a particular dress qualifies for protection."
Once a court determines that a trade dress is protectable, the court
analyzes whether there is a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood
of confusion analysis for trade dress infringement is identical to the
likelihood of confusion analysis used for service mark
174
infringement.
The Pebble Beach court first considered functionality in analyzing
the trade dress infringement issue. If a design or trade dress is
deemed functional, it cannot receive protection under the Lanham
Act. 175 In the past, courts articulated different variations of the same
test to determine functionality. The Pebble Beach court used a test
defined in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. 76 In that
case, the court stated that functionality was dependent upon two
factors. 77 The court looked at whether a design was essential to the
168. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1996).
169. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555.
170. See, Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.
1989); Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Products Co., 791 F.2d 423,425-26 (5th Cir.
1986); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,425 (5th Cir. 1984).
171. Blue Bell Bio-Medical, 864 F.2d at 1256.
172. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555.
176. 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
177. Id
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use or purpose of the article and whether allowing the plaintiff
exclusive use of the design would inhibit competition.17
Tour 18 argued that the plaintiffs' hole designs were functional,
and thus, not entitled to protection. 79 Tour 18 argued for a finding of
functionality. It pointed to the individual design features of each golf
hole. 8 However, the court was more swayed by the plaintiffs'
argument. The plaintiff sought protection for their particular
combinations of individual design features.'
The court analyzed
functionality in terms of the plaintiffs' hole designs viewed in their
entirety.8 2 Using this as a basis for the analysis, the court ruled that
the plaintiffs' hole designs were not functional.' The court reasoned
that there were virtually an unlimited number of ways to design a golf
hole that is both aesthetically pleasing and challenging to the golfer.I"
This finding of non-functionality simply means that the design or
trade dress is capable of being protected.'
A design must still be
distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning to receive protection
under the Lanham Act. 6
The court next considered whether or not the trade dress of the hole
designs and lighthouse were inherently distinctive." 7 A finding of
inherent distinctiveness, coupled with a finding of non-functionality,
gives a particular trade dress or design protection under the Lanham
Act. 188 A particular dress or design will be deemed inherently
distinctive if it serves as source indicator of a product.'89 To make a
determination of inherent distinctiveness, the court uses the same
categorization process it would use to determine if a service mark was
worthy of protection." °
178. Id
179. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1555.

180. Id.

181. Id at 1556.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1556.

185. Id.
186. Id
187. Id
188. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1972).

189. Id at 768-69.
190. See supranote 50.
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Tour 18 argued that the plaintiffs' trade dresses were descriptive
91
and could only be protected on a showing of secondary meaning.1
The plaintiffs argued that their trade dresses were arbitrary and
protectable, even absent a showing of secondary meaning. 92 The
court was more persuaded by Tour 18's argument with respect to
Pebble Beach and Pinehurst because nothing on the Pebble Beach or
Pinehurst golf holes served as a source indicator. 193 While the holes
were challenging and aesthetically pleasing there was nothing
arbitrary or even suggestive about them. 4 Based on this finding, the
hole designs of Pebble Beach and Pinehurst could not receive
protection without a finding of secondary meaning.'95
The court did not follow this line of reasoning with respect to
Harbour Town. 196 Harbour Town's hole eighteen, according to the
court, was inherently distinctive 97 Harbour Town's hole eighteen
contains, as part of the hole design, the lighthouse. The lighthouse
has come to serve as a source indicator for the hole.18 When golfers
see the red and white striped lighthouse, they think of the Harbour
Town golf course.' 99 Golfers have become so familiar with hole
eighteen and the lighthouse that they have nicknamed the hole the
"lighthouse hole."200 Based on the strength of the lighthouse as a
source indicator, the court ruled that the design of Harbour Town hole
eighteen was inherently distinctive and protectable even absent a
showing of secondary meaning.20 '
After determining that the hole designs of Pebble Beach and
Pinehurst were not inherently distinctive, the court analyzed the
designs in terms of whether or not they had acquired secondary
meaning.20 2 These designs could only receive protection on a
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1558.
PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1531.
PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1559.
Id
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showing of secondary meaning." 3 The court used the same inquiry
to determine secondary meaning in trade dress as it did in determining
secondary meaning in service marks. 2 4 Factors such as the duration
of the design's use, the extent of advertising which emphasizes the
design, and the defendant's intent in copying the design are all
relevant to determine secondary meaning." 5
Upon weighing the above mentioned factors, the court found that
there was no secondary meaning in the hole designs of Pebble Beach
and Pinehurst. 206 Although both Pebble Beach and Pinehurst had
extensive advertising campaigns, the court concluded that this was
insufficient to warrant a finding of secondary meaning in their
individual hole designs. 2 7 Neither Pebble Beach nor Pinehurst
featured the designs at issue in their respective advertising
campaigns.208 In addition, both courses had other holes that were
their "signature holes."20 9 The court contrasted this with Sea Pines'
emphasis on Harbour Town hole eighteen in all of its advertising
0
campaigns.

21

The court also considered Tour 18's intentions in copying the hole
designs of Pebble Beach and Pinehurst. 21 1 Evidence of intentional
copying can lead to a finding of secondary meaning.2 12 However, it
is only one of many factors, and not the decisive factor to be
considered.213 While it was undisputed that Tour 18 intentionally
copied the hole designs of all the plaintiffs, the court found greater
203. Id. at 1558..
204. Id at 1539. Factors the court considers in determining secondary meaning

for a service mark include the length and manner of use of the mark by the plaintiff;
the extent of advertising and promotion ofthe mark; efforts to promote a connection
between the mark and the services provided; and the defendant's intent in copying
the mark.
205. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1559. See also, Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy
Plastic Enter., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452-53 (3d Cir. 1994).
206. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1561.
207. Id at 1560.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1560.
212. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C. Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1041
(2d Cir. 1992).
213. Id.
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significance in that neither Pebble Beach nor Pinehurst's promotional
campaigns focused on the holes at issue.214
Because the court held that Pebble Beach and Pinehurst failed to
show inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning in their hole
designs, only the design of Harbour Town hole eighteen was analyzed
to determine whether Tour 18 was liable for trade dress
infringement. 215 A defendant is liable for trade dress infringement if
there is a likelihood of confusion. 216 The court balanced the same
factors used in determining the likelihood of confusion for service
mark infringement. 217 The court had already found a likelihood of
confusion as to Tour 18's use of Sea Pine's Harbour Town service
marks, and since the analysis is identical for trade dress, the court
ruled in favor bf Sea Pines on the claim of trade dress infiingement
under the Lanham Act.218
In addition to the service mark infringement and trade dress
infringement claims, the plaintiffs also brought a claim of false
advertising against Tour 18.219 They claimed that Tour 18's use of
terms, such as "replication" and "copy", were likely to lead customers
220
to believe that Tour 18's holes were exact copies of the originals.
The court dismissed this claim concluding that there was no literal
falsity in Tour 18 calling their holes replications or copies. 22 ' The
court also dismissed the claim based on the fact that holding Tour
18's holes out as replications or copies was unlikely to deceive
customers.222
The plaintiffs also brought a cause of action under the Texas anti214. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1560.
215. Id at 1561.
216. Id

217. See supranote 79 at 1561. The court may consider: the strength of the

plaintiff's trade dress; the degree of similarity between the plaintiffs and
defendant's trade dress; the similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's

services; the identity of the customers; the similarity between the advertising; the
defendant's intent incopying the trade dress; and any evidence of actual confusion.
218. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1561.
219. Id.
at 1562.
220. Id.

221. Id
222. Id
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dilution statute. 2' The court used the same analysis in the dilution
claim as it did in determining service mark and trade dress
infringement. 4 The only difference was that the court analyzed the
likelihood of dilution rather than the likelihood of confusion. 225 The
court found, with respect to their service marks, there was evidence
of blurring.226 With respect to the plaintiffs' trade dresses, only
Harbour Town had a valid claim under the anti-dilution statute
because only Sea Pines's design of Harbour Town hole eighteen was
determined to be distinctive.227
C. Remedies
Having determined that Tour 18 was liable, at least in some form,
to all three plaintiffs, the court needed to fashion a remedy for each
plaintiff. The plaintiffs sought damages, attorney's fees, and
injunctive relief.228 The court found no evidentiary support to warrant
an award of actual damages to the plaintiffs.229 Under the Lanham
'
Act, attorneys fees can only be awarded in "exceptional cases."23
Courts have defined "exceptional" to mean bad faith on the part of
the defendant. 1 Since there was no evidence of bad faith on the part
of Tour 18, an award of attorney's fees was not appropriate.232
Injunctive relief was the only available remedy.233 Tour 18 was
enjoined from using the names "Pebble Beach," "Pinehurst" and
223. Id. at 1563.
224. Id at 1564. The court first asked if the mark was distinctive and worthy
of protection. Having made the determination before, the court ruled that all three

marks and the lighthouse were distinctive. Next the court determines whether there
is a likelihood of dilution through either tarnishment of the mark or blurring.
225. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp at 1564. The court analyzed likelihood of
dilution in terms of tamishment and blurring. The court found in favor of Tour 18
on the tarnishment claim. However, the court determined that the plaintiffs had
proved their case with respect to the blurring of their service marks.
226. Id.
at 1567.
227. Id.

228. Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1571.
229. Id.
230. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1996).
231. Seven-Up v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1390 (5th Cir. 1996).

232. PebbleBeach, 942 F. Supp. at 1572.
233. Id at 1572.
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"Harbour Town" in all contexts except comparative advertising 34
According to the court, this meant that Tour 18 could only use the
names in conjunction with a prominent and clear disclaimer. 5
Tour 18 was not enjoined from copying the hole designs of Pebble
Beach or Pinehurst, but it was enjoined from using or constructing a
trade dress or lighthouse that was confusingly similar to the trade
dress of Harbour Town hole eighteen.1 6 Tour 18 was also required
to .take corrective action to alleviate the confusion that had already
been caused."
III. CONCLUSION

At first glance, Tour 18's idea seemed to be a business venture that
could not lose. The developers of Tour 18, however, lost more than
they ever imagined. In effect, the court stripped Tour 18 of the very
essence of its idea. Even though the court followed a firmly
established test, it read the likelihood of confusion doctrine very
broadly. Allowing the likelihood of confusion as to permission
actionable, even with the presence of disclaimers, the court gave
senior users of a mark, such as the plaintiffs in this case, a great deal
of power over junior users. Tour 18's allowable use of the plaintiffs'
service marks and hole designs were greatly diminished as a result of
the court's decision. This was done even though the harm to the
plaintiffs, as a result of Tour 18's original use of their marks, would
be minimal at best. The standard the court adopted gave a service
mark or trade dress owner much greater protection against
unauthorized use at the expense of the junior user.

Katherine Watson
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id at 1572-73.
Id.at 1573.
Id.
Id.
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